

Expansion into Leeds: new premises and new members

In accordance with our policy of continual expansion, Chambers is pleased to announce the recent opening of new premises at 25 Park Square in Leeds. These are substantially larger than those at 31 Park Square and comprises 2 large conference rooms together with a clerks room and seven rooms providing working space for members. The premises will be fully staffed at all times. Chambers wishes to increase it's client base and develop all areas of it's expertise in Leeds and the surrounding district.

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Additionally Graham Hyland QC is pleased to welcome four new tenants to chambers, all formerly of St. Pauls House Chambers in Leeds. They are Robert Cole, Matthew Rudd, Nicholas Power and Matthew Stott, all of whom practise primarily in family and childcare law. Together with our existing family law practitioners, Chambers is now able to provide clients with unrivalled expertise in these areas of the law, at every level.

Robert Cole was called in 1991 and has an established ancillary relief practice. He regularly acts for high profile clients with substantial assets. He has particular expertise in complicated pension share and offsetting cases. His accountancy background enables him to deal with corporate structures and company valuations, as well as dissipation of assets through corporate entities. Additionally Robert is experienced in private and public children cases. A number of his cases on jurisdictional issues have been reported.




Matthew Rudd practises primarily in employment and family law. He was called in 1994 and advises clients on all aspects of dismissals, discrimination, Trade Union Law, work related stress and Injunctive relief. His family practice consists of all areas of ancillary relief, the recovery and preservation of assets, pension attachment sharing orders and public and private Children Act cases.



Nicholas Power

was admitted as a solicitor in 1998 and called to the Bar in 2004. Both as a solicitor and now as counsel he practises exclusively in family law. He has a wide range of experience in ancillary relief proceedings (involving both high and low value assets), and children law (representing public and private clients). He has particular experience in cases involving disputed medical evidence. He was highlighted in the Chambers Directory for 2007 as "forging a reputation as a result of his modern and practical approach".




Matthew Stott

(Call 2005, Middle Temple Queen Mother Scholar) has been developing his practice in family law and civil litigation. His family work includes private and public children law, ancillary relief including co-habitation disputes, domestic violence and committals. His civil practice revolves around personal injury, employer's liability contract, professional negligence and CICA appeals.



Chambers is also pleased to congratulate and welcome **Claire Larton**, who has completed her pupillage and accepted an invitation to join chambers as a tenant. She will be practising primarily in criminal law.



Recent Case Law on the viability assessments of family members and friends in Care Proceedings

by Joanna Moody

During the course of care proceedings family members and friends can put themselves forward as carers. In such circumstances the Local Authority will undertake a viability assessment.

A viability assessment tends to be undertaken as a preliminary assessment, akin to a 'sifting out' process, and can range in its nature from the very basic to the more detailed assessment. Invariably such an assessment will be undertaken by a social worker employed by the Local Authority and tends to be one that is involved in the ongoing care proceedings. A negative assessment will mean that the Local Authority does not intend to undertake any further assessment of that family member or friend.

In the event of a negative assessment those representing such family members or friends may seek to apply for a further independent assessment. Recent case law has provided some guidance on such applications.

Re M-H (A Child) [2006] EWCA Civ 1864

This case concerned a child (K) who was just under 3 years of age. The Local Authority was seeking a Care Order and a Placement Order in relation to K. Mr F, who was not the father of K but was the father of K's half-sibling, put himself forward as a carer for K. The Local Authority undertook a viability assessment of Mr F in April 2006 and concluded that he would not be a suitable carer for K. At the pre-hearing review in July 2006 Mr F sought leave for an independent assessment. This was refused. He unsuccessfully renewed his application at the final hearing in August 2006. The trial judge made a Care Order and a Placement Order in respect of K. Mr F appealed. Lord Justice Wall found:

a) The judge was plainly wrong in refusing to grant leave for an independent assessment. He had observed that the 'assessment was wholly inadequate and flawed. It was flawed for these reasons; whilst it does record the strengths,

it does not do so adequately. It does not, in particular, emphasise the advantage of K being brought up with his half-sibling, the importance of sibling attachments. On the negatives it refers to the criminal record [of Mr F] but the author had not full access to it';

- b) The judge was also plainly wrong to think that the gap could and would be plugged by the Guardian, whose evidence was unequivocal in that 'a full assessment was not recommended';
- c) The judge was wrong to assert that 'nothing arising out of a further social worker assessment could change the position', for this was something he could not know;
- d) An independent assessment will be ordered;
- e) The Care Order will be set aside and an Interim Care Order made, and the Placement Order will be set aside or suspended;
- f) Whilst the delay was regrettable, it was proportionate when considering the fundamental nature of the decision and the fact that K would remain with his current foster carer until the matter was resolved.

I have used this authority to successfully argue for an independent assessment of a relative. However it ought to be read alongside the following case where such an application was not successful.

Re G & B (Children) [2007] EWCA Civ 358

This case concerned two children, MG aged 5 years and DARG aged 18 months. The judge at first instance had made Care Orders and Placement Orders in relation to both children. The mother appealed against the making of the Placement Orders on the basis that the Local Authority should have undertaken an assessment of her foster sister (Ms B) as a carer of the two children. Lord Justice Wall found:

- a) The Local Authority had erred in failing to call the family group conference, which had been approved and facilitated by an order of the court;
- b) However, it was properly open to the judge to use his discretion to

make a Placement Order. There was sufficient evidence before the court from the Local Authority and the Guardian that they did not consider Ms B to be a suitable carer. There was also evidence before the court about her personal circumstances that made it very unlikely that she would prove to be suitable. Further the judge at first instance had the opportunity to see Ms B in the witness box and to make his own assessment of her;

- c) In referring to Re M-H Wall LJ did not resile from his judgment in that case but stated that 'there is inevitably a difficulty in extracting statements of principle from an individual case and applying them to a quite different case with different facts';
- d) Ms B should have put herself forward as a carer at a much earlier stage. It was unacceptable that she only put herself forward at the final hearing. If a family member wishes to be assessed as carer he or she should come forward at the earliest possible opportunity.

Clearly the merits of such applications will depend upon the circumstances of each individual case. However, the words of Wall LJ in Re M-H serve as a useful starting point:

'the exercise of a judicial discretion in a care case is an amalgam of expertise from a number of disciplines, an essential part of which is or should be competent social work assessments which the judge can then appraise and accept or reject.'



Joanna Moody practises in Family Law.

Causing a death

by Jonathan Gibson

Recently I prosecuted the trial of R-v-Binns at Bradford Crown Court (HH Judge Benson and a jury). The case had rather unusual facts. The defendant, charged with causing death by dangerous driving, was alleged to have chased 4 boys on bicycles, in his car. One of the boys, the deceased, was riding a defective bicycle with an unstable front wheel and no effective brakes. The chase commenced on a road which was reasonably level. The allegation was that, as a result of the Defendant chasing them, the boys turned left down a steep hill to get away. The Defendant did not follow them down the hill. At the bottom of the hill the deceased fell from the bicycle and sustained fatal injuries.

A number of factors were potentially causative of the death; the defendant's alleged dangerous driving in chasing the boys; the defective state of the bicycle; and the poor cycling skills of the deceased. There was evidence in the case that earlier on that day, the deceased, when he came to a steep hill, had dismounted and walked to the bottom. The prosecution submitted that, but for the defendant's dangerous driving, the deceased would not have ridden down the hill. The defence submitted that, by the time the

deceased fell from his bicycle, any dangerous driving on the part of the defendant was no longer causative (or sufficiently causative) of the death.

To what extent must the dangerous driving have been responsible for the death? Must the Crown prove it was the only cause, the main cause, a substantial cause or merely a cause?

The prosecution need only prove the driving was a cause of death. Even if there is another cause, more substantial, provided the defendant's dangerous driving is a cause, more than *de minimis*, of the death, the prosecution may succeed.

In the leading case of Hennigan (1971) 55 Cr App R 263 the Lord Chief Justice said, "So long as the dangerous driving is a cause and something more than *de minimis*, the statute operates". In that case, it was said that the driver of the vehicle into which the defendant crashed at speed "might have been held substantially to blame" in a civil action.

Hennigan was applied in the cases of Skelton [1995 Crim LR 635] and Kimsey [1996] Crim LR 35. Skelton knowingly drove a defective lorry which broke down on a major road. Twelve minutes later, another lorry crashed into the back of it

and the driver of that lorry was killed. It was held that the driver remained liable for the consequences of his dangerous driving even though he had stopped driving the vehicle some time before the accident occurred, which resulted in death. The court said the dangerous driving must have played a part in bringing about the fatal accident and that there is no particular degree of contribution to the death required, beyond a negligible one.

In my case, the judge directed the jury that the prosecution must prove that the dangerous driving was a cause of the death and that it must be a significant cause (as opposed to a trifling, slight or insignificant one).

In the event, the jury found this interesting issue to be entirely academic! Not only did they acquit the defendant of causing death by dangerous driving, but of the alternative dangerous driving count as well.



Jonathan Gibson practises in criminal law and sits as a Crown Court Recorder and on Medical Tribunals.

Members of Chambers

Graham Hyland QC
Martin Wood
John Topham
Richard Barlow
Paul Isaacs
Andrew Kershaw
Ian Newbon
Rae Cohen
Gordon Shelton
Jonathan Gibson
David McGonigal
David Jones
Peter Birkby
Ian Howard
Simon Myers
Nicholas Askins
Paul Wilson

Sophie Drake
Robert Cole
Stephen Wood
Tahir Khan
Benjamin Crosland
Gerald Hendron
Michelle Colborne
Sarah Barlow
Jonathan Walker-Kane
Matthew Rudd
Jayne Beckett
Nicola Peers
Camille Morland
Simon Anderson
Ian Brown
Shufqat Khan
Tasaddat Hussain

Ian Miller
Joanna Moody
Giles Bridge
Ken Green
Lesley Dickinson
Emma Downing
Peter Hampton
Chris Brown
Alexander Modgill
Nicholas Power
Louise Azmi
Sharn Samra
Nigel Hamilton
Rachel Mellor
Matthew Stott
Clare Larton

Police officers on juries?

By David McGonigal

The case of Regina v Abdroikof, Green and Williamson [2007] UKHL 37 has made it possible for the defence to successfully challenge jurors who are police officers in cases where other officers of the same force are giving evidence which is disputed by the defence. Additionally members of the prosecuting body who bring the case may also be excluded from service.

The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (section 321 and schedule 33) allowing police officers and those involved in the legal system to sit as jurors has raised many eyebrows and doubtlessly led to some interesting experiences, particularly for members of the legal profession and the judiciary. One might be forgiven for attempting to re-cast 'Twelve angry men' from those who appear regularly in Bradford Crown Court. However the widening of those entitled to join jury panels has predictably given rise to litigation where there maybe conflicting loyalties.

It was not submitted in Abdroikof that the inclusion of those paid to uphold and administer the law to the jury panel breached a defendant's right to a fair trial provided by section 6(1) European Convention on Human Rights. However the majority in the House concluded that the new law was subject to the long established principle that "it ...is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done" (R v Susses Justices, Ex p McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 at 259). There was no suggestion in the three appeals in Abdroikof that any of the jurors had in

fact displayed bias towards the prosecution. The House acknowledged that there were many safeguards established to protect the impartiality of the jury from their own conscious or unconscious prejudices (for instance the judge's directions in summing-up). However in the two cases where the appeals were allowed there was the possibility of bias arising from jurors "personally or professionally committed to one side only of the adversarial trial process" (words of counsel for the appellants - paragraph 23 and echoed by Baroness Hale in paragraph 49 - all references to paragraphs are from the speeches in Abdroikof). The majority considered this possible bias was greater than any general partiality towards one side or the other, which any member of the public might possess. The majority concluded that the question to be possessed in each case was whether a fair minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility that the jury were biased (paragraphs 26, 45 and 80).

In the first of the appeals, that of Abdroikof himself, (attempted murder) the appeal was dismissed because although one of the jurors was a serving police officer there was only "a minor issue concerning one aspect" of a police officer's evidence. Lord Bingham said "*it was not a case which turned on a contest between the evidence of the police and that of the appellant, and it would have been hard to suggest that the case was one in which unconscious prejudice, even if present, would have been likely to operate to the disadvantage of the appellant*" (paragraph 25).

In the second case, Green, (assault occasioning actual bodily harm and having a pointed article) there was a dispute between the appellant and a police officer concerning the manner in which the appellant had been searched and what had been said by both of them. The officer on the jury and the officer giving evidence had shared the same local service background, though they were unknown to each other. His appeal was allowed. Lord Bingham said at paragraph 26

"In this context the instinct (however unconscious) of a police officer on the jury to prefer the evidence of a brother officer to that of a drug-addicted defendant would be judged by the fair-minded and informed observer to be a real and possible source of unfairness, beyond the reach of standard judicial warnings and directions. The second appellant was not tried by a tribunal which was and appeared to be impartial."

Lord Mance (the third majority opinion) appeared to restrict the cases in which an officer ought not to sit on a jury to cases where there was a significant conflict of evidence and there was some connection between the officers giving evidence and the potential juror (paragraph 83). It is not clear whether Lord Bingham would have reached the same conclusion if the officer on the jury had not shared the "same local service background" to those giving evidence. Baroness Hale, who gave the second majority opinion, had her view fortified by the fact that the officer on the jury was posted to a police station, which committed its cases to the Crown Court where the case was tried (paragraph 53).

The third appellant, Williamson, charged with two rapes, was convicted by a jury containing a long serving member of the Crown Prosecution

Service, who worked for the particular prosecution authority bringing the case. No criticism was made that he had in fact shown prejudice, notwithstanding the feature that he was the jury foreman. Williamson's appeal was allowed. Lord Bingham said

"It is in my opinion clear that justice is not seen to be done if one discharging the very important neutral role of juror is a full-time, salaried, long-serving employee of the prosecutor".

It is of interest that there was no mention by Lord Bingham of the nature of the issues in the evidence. Presumably that is because the risk of bias is towards the prosecuting body not just one aspect of the evidence, as in the case of a police officer.

Williamson's case particularly illustrates the importance of the principle that justice should "be seen to be done". The evidence against him was reasonably compelling (it is briefly set out in the speech of Lord Carswell in paragraph 75) and led Lord Bingham to say (perhaps injudiciously) "...even a guilty defendant is entitled to be tried by an impartial tribunal ..." (paragraph 27).

It does appear that all trials may require questioning of the jury panel to ensure there are no employees of the Crown Prosecution Service, connected with the branch bringing the prosecution, on the panel (though CPS employees are advised to bring to the court's attention their presence – guidance issued in November 2004). Additionally in cases where there is a significant issue between the defendant and police officers, questions of the panel should be asked

to determine if there are any serving or former officers present. In such a case an officer will have to be questioned further to determine whether he is linked with those giving evidence or the station involved in bring the case to court. This course was foreseen by Lord Justice Auld, whose "Review of the Criminal Courts" in 2001 gave rise to the extension of eligibility for jury service. He said

"...it would be for the judge in each case to satisfy himself that the potential juror in question was not likely to engender any reasonable suspicion or apprehension of bias so as to distinguish him from other members of the public who would normally be expected to uphold the law." (chapter 5 paragraph 30).

Baroness Hale was of the view that Parliament "may well have contemplated a rather closer inquiry into the circumstances of each individual police juror than in fact takes place" (paragraph 52). In the appeals of Abdroikof and Green the presence of the "offending" juror was only discovered by chance, not by any questioning of the panel.

The process of jury selection in this country remains much simpler than in America. It remains to be seen whether the House of Lords have given Lord Hewart's statement of principle in R v Sussex Justices a basis for a greater degree of jury interrogation to take place.



David McGonigal practises in Criminal Law.

Have you ever wondered....?

....Why do Judges and Barristers wear wigs?

The story of how the judiciary came to wear wigs begins at least as far back as 1635. The Judges' Rules issued that year prescribed three layers of head-dress - a white lawn coif followed by a black skullcap and then a black cornered cap.

Almost 50 years later, this head-dress began to change. When Charles II returned from exile in France, he brought with him the French fashion of wig-wearing. With the keen fashion sense of the time and a fondness for the latest innovations, it wasn't long before wigs became an essential fashion accessory for the well-to-do. In the 1680s, both the judiciary and the bar followed suit and as a result, the coif and the skull cap began to shrink in size until they were eventually abandoned. The indentation seen on the top of judicial wigs to this day is the last reminder of the existence of the coif. The black cornered cap was eventually only worn on formal occasions and by Victorian times, it had taken on darker overtones and was associated with the passing of a death sentence.

The wigs themselves also evolved over the years. Up until about 1770, judges strictly kept to wearing the full-bottomed wig. This began to change, as many judges took to wearing the short bob-wig for ordinary occasions in court. Eventually this became the ordinary wig for judges sitting in court, with the full-bottomed wig reserved for ceremonial occasions

Manslaughter and the Drug Supplier

By Stephen Wood

A commentary upon R v Kennedy (No 2) [2007] UKHL 38

In this case the Court of Appeal certified the following question of general public importance for the opinion of the House of Lords: “When is it appropriate to find someone guilty of manslaughter where that person has been involved in the supply of a class A controlled drug, which is then freely and voluntarily self-administered by the person to whom it was supplied, and the administration of the drug then causes his death?”

The appellant prepared a dose of heroin for the deceased and gave him a syringe ready for injection. The deceased then injected himself and returned the empty syringe to the appellant. The deceased then appeared to stop breathing and was pronounced dead on arrival at hospital.

To establish the crime of manslaughter based on the unlawful act of the defendant it has to be shown:

- (1) that the defendant committed an unlawful act; and
- (2) that such unlawful act was a crime; and
- (3) that the defendant’s unlawful act was a significant cause of the death of the deceased.

In this case there was no doubt but that the appellant had committed an

unlawful (and criminal) act by supplying the heroin to the deceased. But the mere act of supplying, without more, could not harm the deceased in any physical way, let alone cause his death. So an unlawful act of the appellant on the facts had to be found, if at all, in a breach of section 23 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, (administering a noxious thing to, or causing a noxious thing to be administered to, or taken by, another person).

The criminal law generally assumes the existence of free will. The law recognises certain exceptions; for example in the case of the young, those who for any reason were not fully responsible for their actions, and the vulnerable. Further, the law acknowledges situations of duress and necessity, and also of deception and mistake. But, generally speaking, informed adults of sound mind are to be treated as autonomous beings capable of making their own decisions.

In this case the finding that the deceased freely and voluntarily administered the injection to himself, knowing what it was, was fatal to any contention that the appellant “caused” the heroin to be administered to or be taken by the deceased. The sole argument open to the Crown was, therefore, that the appellant “administered” the injection. Reliance was placed on the steps taken by the appellant to facilitate the injection and the trial judge’s direction to the jury that they had to be satisfied that the

appellant handed the syringe to the deceased “for immediate injection”.

The essential *ratio* of the decision of the Court of Appeal (who upheld the conviction) was that the administration of the injection had been a joint activity of the appellant and the deceased. It is possible to imagine factual scenarios in which two people could properly be regarded as acting together to administer an injection. But the House of Lords concluded, on the facts, nothing of the kind was the case here. The appellant supplied the drug to the deceased, who then had a choice, knowing the facts, whether to inject himself or not. The heroin was self-administered, not jointly administered. The appellant did not administer the drug and his conviction for manslaughter had to be quashed.

Thus, the answer to the certified question was “In a case where the deceased was a fully-informed and responsible adult, never”.



Stephen Wood practises primarily in criminal law.

Time limits for the service of Tribunal determinations and the lodging of appeals

By *Tasaddat Hussain*

Recently the Appeals Immigration Tribunal in the decision of FS (Service of Determination) Eritrea [2007] UKAIT 84 gave the following guidance on the calculation of time limits for service of Tribunal determinations and the lodging of appeals. From that case the following points can be gleaned:

- (i) The five days (for in country appeals) & 28 days (for out of country appeals) under s103(A)(3) is to be calculated in accordance with CPR 2.8;
- (ii) 4pm is the deadline for the particular 'working day' - CPR 6.7(1) thus any grounds sent **after 4pm** will be deemed to have been served on the **next working day**;
- (iii) 5 days under s103(A)(3) is 'clear days' - thus the day the appellant receives the determination does not count - CPR 2.7(2)(iii);
- (iv) Saturdays and Sundays do not count toward the calculation of 'clear days' under s103(A)(3) - CPR 2.7(4) for the purpose of calculating deemed date of service.
- (v) Saturday **does** count towards the calculation of the two days considered sufficient for deemed date of service in asylum cases but **not** a Sunday as the Tribunal took judicial notice that there is no postal service in the United Kingdom on a Sunday. So for example if your client receives his determination on a Saturday, he has until the following Friday 4pm to lodge his appeal in time (i.e. 5 clear working days - Monday to Friday, not until the Monday of the following week as was previously thought);
- (vi) If there is a possibility that your grounds are out of time - **always** attach a statement of truth applying for an extension of time and state the reasons why - the Senior Immigration Judge has a wide discretion to extend time;
- (vii) If you want to dispute the deemed date of service - (two working days from date of posting) you can do so by including a statement of truth to that effect and specifying the date of actual receipt;
- (viii) Under r 55(4) of the AIT (Procedure) Rules 2005 (SI/2005/230) if you're on record as acting, then service is deemed to have taken place when you, as representative, are in possession of the determination (subject to the rules above). However, receiving the determination **later** than the client, does **not** extend the 5 clear working days - it runs from when the 'party' i.e. the appellant is deemed to have receipt. So advise clients to call you as soon as they receive a copy of the determination;
- (ix) If you want to rebut the deemed date of service (on the 'party') judicial notice can be taken of this, by filing a statement of truth or by any other acceptable means. Always send in an application to extend time, in the alternative, in case your initial 'in time' contention is rejected.



Tasaddat Hussain practises in Immigration and Family Law.

Editor's Notes Section 34 and solicitor advocates

In T -v- DPP [2007] EWHC 1793(Admin) the Court of Appeal commented on the difficulties for solicitors in deciding whether to represent a defendant at trial when they had been present during a no comment interview at the police station. The Court said "The question of whether section 34 (adverse inferences) arises or not can only very rarely be foreseen before the defence case has been made. In every case solicitors have necessarily to judge for themselves, first of all, whether an issue under section 34 is likely to arise and, secondly, if it does, whether they are likely to have to become a witness of fact. In making that decision, they will of course have the advantage, such as it is, of knowing what the defence proof of evidence indicates." The court emphasised the danger of relying on a pre-trial review form setting out the absence of reference by either side to the possibility of a section 34 issue arising. (editor's suggestion - if in doubt brief counsel!!)

TIC's and their disadvantages

In June 2007 new guidance was issued by the CPS to reinvigorate the use of TIC's. It points out 7 opportunities to invite the defendant to make further admissions ranging from the booking in stage to the prison visit after conviction. Of course the more offences "cleaned up" for the CPS the better the crime statistics. There are disadvantages to the defendant, particularly in admitting offences where there is, and never would be, any evidence implicating him. TIC's can increase the total seriousness (R v Miles [2006] EWCA 256; if admitted early they may encourage charge rather than a form of pre-court diversion; and they may be relevant to any issue of dangerousness and to

criminal lifestyle/benefit in confiscation proceedings.

It is worth remembering the evidential test for a crime to be counted as a TIC. It is set out in the Home Office Counting Rules on Detections: "*there must be sufficient evidence to charge the suspect with the crime*". This usually means an admission, corroborated by a crime report and a material fact, such as forensic evidence linking offender and offence, or detail, which the offender could not have known otherwise. Too often defendants are encouraged to admit offences about which they have no or little recollection.

More regularly police officers attend on defendants without notification to their

legal representative. The "Prosecution team guidance on offences to be taken into consideration" published in May 2007 states at paragraph 9.5 that "the suspect's legal representative should be informed that the suspect has been given the TIC notice and that it is intended to raise the topic in the course of the interview. Sufficient disclosure should be given to the suspect's legal representative in respect of both the primary offence(s) and the potential TIC offence(s) to enable appropriate legal advice to be given." The full texts of the documents referred to can be found on the CPS website at www.cps.gov.uk.

Chambers News

Chambers Christmas Party

Chamber's gratitude to its many clients will be expressed by the traditional festive function taking place at the **Hilton Hotel in**

Bradford on th 19th December

commencing at 6pm. Ben Crosland and his jazz trio will be playing followed by music demanding greater audience participation. All our clients are invited, any, inexplicitly, without invitations please contact Helen Craven, our administrator.

New Civil and Family clerk

Stephanie Hunt has joined the civil clerking team. She previously worked for the Accent Group at their Head office as an Office Management Assistant.

Any views/quips expressed in the newsletter are those of the editor (David McGonigal) and should not be taken to represent those of chambers. No article may be reproduced without the permission of the author.

Forthcoming Employment Seminar

Paul Wilson *and* Sharn Samra will be delivering a seminar entitled

**"That was the year that was:
a review of the case law of 2007"**

in **Sheffield** on the 9th January 2008 at 35a Paradise Street Sheffield S3 8PZ at 6pm

Please contact Robin Slade for further details, to book a place and for course notes via e-mail.

Contact details

Broadway House
9 Bank Street, BRADFORD,
West Yorkshire, BD1 1TW
Telephone: 01274 722560
Fax: 01274 370708
DX: 729860 Bradford 22

25 Park Square West,
LEEDS,
West Yorkshire, LS1 2PW
Telephone: 0113 246 2600
Fax: 0113 246 2609
DX: 26403 Leeds Park Square

E-mail: clerks@broadwayhouse.co.uk
Internet: www.broadwayhouse.co.uk

Civil Clerks: Robin Slade, Kelly Handforth,
Stephanie Hunt
Criminal Clerks: David Rhodes, Teresa Pugh,
Katie Tillet
Office Administrator: Helen Craven